There is an increasing trend among European intellectuals, politicians, and essayists to describe Islam as a major cause of the current identity crisis of most European countries. Christopher Caldwell’s book, Reflections on the Revolution in Europe: Immigration, Islam, and the West [see “New Book Stokes Fear of a Muslim Europe” by Bruce B. Lawrence], is based on the same simple premise that permeates today’s political and public discourse on Islam: Europe’s Muslims are responsible for the radical transformation and increased vulnerability of the continent’s culture and identity.
It is undeniable that many of these changes were triggered by the arrival of large numbers of immigrants from Africa, North Africa, and Asia; as a result, cultural and religious institutions in Europe are facing many serious challenges. And yet even if this central assumption is true and Caldwell’s overall analysis of cultural and demographic evolution of Europe is correct, the author examines the questions within the primitive trappings of “The Green Peril.” Following a long list of European intellectuals such as Oriana Fallaci, Michel Houellebecq, and Caroline Forest, he argues that Europe is succumbing to an “Islamic culture” incompatible with its “core” political and cultural values.
The intriguing question is: Why is Caldwell’s book receiving more attention in the American media (such as the front page of the New York Times Book Review section) than the traditional Islamophobe pamphlet “a la Oriana Fallaci?” The reason, astutely inferred by Matt Carr at the Institute for Race and Class, is that this book presents itself as an objective and rational work; based on facts, data, and informed research.
Despite this polished façade, Caldwell’s book is nothing more than a patchwork of clichés and stereotypes about Islam and Muslims; exploiting the fear of, and insecurity about, Islam. Consider for example the book’s demographic argument. It is true that the natural demographic growth across Europe (2.1 children per woman) currently trails the rate of natural population loss. It is also true that Europe’s current population growth is largely the result of immigration. However, immigration is not synonymous with Islam. While it could be said that most Muslims in Europe are immigrants or have an immigrant background, not all immigrants are Muslim.
Caldwell tries, though, to sound the alarm by repeating the common refrain that Muslim families in Europe tend to maintain a very high level of fertility. Once again, this statement contains a partial truth and misses the big picture. Population growth indeed tends to be high in Muslim countries compared to their European counterparts. Still, birth rates within many Islamic countries have declined drastically over the past 20 years. A more accurate assessment of demographic trends among Muslims would reveal that high variations in fertility occur throughout the Muslim world; from Egypt to Morocco and Indonesia. Such analysis would attribute variation in fertility rates not to Islam, but to the specific cultural and political conditions within each locality. It is certainly true that immigrant communities often exhibit higher fertility rates than host populations overall. But over time these rates usually fall in line with those of the indigenous population, as shown by serious demographers for second- and third-generation Algerian immigrants in France.
The second main point of Caldwell’s book concerns the supposed incompatibility of Islam with European political and cultural principles. The author defends the assertion by stating that Islam in Europe constitutes an “adversary culture” whose religious leaders intimidate critics and display scant loyalty to the countries in which they reside.
Such rhetoric follows a pattern that Mahmood Mamdani identified as “cultural talk” in his book Good Muslim, Bad Muslim. “Cultural talk” is based upon a view of Islam as a unified ideology which spreads from Europe all the way to Iraq and Afghanistan. According to this outlook, Muslims are petrified in history and occupy a mold from which they cannot escape; defined by their so-called conformity to the past and their incapacity to address the current challenges of political development and liberal religious thinking. Such an approach justifies the creation of an insurmountable boundary between modern and pre-modern, and between secularism and Islam.
A more accurate assessment of Muslims in Europe should abandon the false precept of a monolithic Islam. Instead it should focus on the multiplicity of cultures belonging to Muslims around the world, and highlight results from surveys which regularly point to the important role played in an individual’s relationship to Islam by acculturation, secularization, and individualization. One such survey was derived from the results of focus groups conducted in Paris, London, Amsterdam, and Berlin from 2008-09. It concluded that of the 500 Muslims questioned from a diverse range of ethnic backgrounds, individuals overall had highly flexible approaches to Islam and were willing to adapt their religious practice in order to fit into Western society.
In the end, Caldwell does not delve into the social, economic, and migratory conditions that form the experience of many Muslims in Europe. An understanding of Muslims in Europe today cannot be achieved through facile analyses of a monolithic Islam; but instead in the unpacking of several important assertions that tend to conflate Islam, immigration, and socio-economic issues.
As mentioned above, most Muslims in Europe are immigrants, but the opposite is not true. Although immigrants arrive in Europe from all over the world, the countries with existing Muslim populations tend to attract those from the same ethnic background. Among current European Union member states, only Greece has a significant indigenous population of Muslims, residing primarily in Thrace. Therefore, categories of “immigrant” and “Muslim” overlap in Western Europe; unlike in the United States where immigration debates center on economic and social concerns such as wages, assimilation, and language. This conflation between Islam and immigration explains why several proposals for immigration and naturalization reform (for example in the Netherlands or Germany) openly target Muslim migrants. It is a pity that Caldwell reinforces the misconceptions which so frequently confuse European discourse on this topic.
While Muslims are part of an underclass of Europe, this is not caused by some factor unique to Islam but by specific conditions of labor migration and structural changes in the labor market over the last 25 years. These changes in turn led to the deterioration of significant parts of the working classes across Europe.
The various problems and implications of these topics have been subsumed under general analyses of Islam. Many scholars have unpacked and illuminated these intertwined subjects. But Caldwell ignores surveys and research conducted on Muslims in Europe that have tried to deconstruct a false perception that related questions are a uniquely “Muslim problem.” And by simply duplicating for the American audience the “cultural talk” of Europe, the author ignores the unique situation which exists in Europe among Muslims. He also fails to see that the real conflict occurring is not one between a mythified Europe and a frozen unhistorical Islam, but among Muslims themselves who are struggling to redefine their religious identities in the European context.
Caldwell has the right subject in mind: Europe is undergoing a cultural and political evolution. Islam and Muslims, however, are a catalyst—not the cause. Pitching a fixed Europe against a fixed Islam is playing the game of fundamentalists who use exactly the same discourse. Samuel Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations, after all, is structured around just such an argument, and one should not forget that the work remains a favorite of radical Muslims to this day.
Tags: christopher caldwell, clash of civilizations, euro-islam, europe, european muslims, islam, islamophobia, samuel p huntington
"Caldwell tries though to sound the alarm by repeating the common refrain that Muslim families in Europe tend to maintain a very high level of fertility. Once again, this statement contains a partial truth and misses the big picture. Population growth indeed tends to be high in Muslim countries compared to their European counterparts. Still, birthrates within many Islamic countries have declined drastically over the past 20 years."
Please explain the connection between birthrates within Islamic countries and the birthrates of muslims in Europe.
Part 1
You are an American ??
You would have to be in Europe to understand the Islamic immigration issue -
What is happening is that have traditional practise of arranged marriages - for ex. when you want to marry or even when Black Muslims (mostly first or second generation Christian converts) - you are likely to find a partner locally and marry.
When a Muslim in Europe wants to marry - then it becomes an immigration issue. Because more than 60% of the time - in Denmark the figures were higher - Muslims have to arrange marriages for their children - from the old country. Denmark completely stopped the practise back in 2002 - before the word Islamophobe was invented - because they found that these levels of immigration were unsustainable - as well as it was costing the state some 10 billion Krona - a year to settle all these newcomers into society.
One study in either Denmark or Norway - found that a group of 1000 Turkish immigrant - had increased to 20,000 in 20 years. It was not from having lots of children - it was the marriages - so named 'fetching or immigration marriages'. The study found - that there were virtually no marriages between this Muslim community and the natives (they counted 4) - and that almost everyone found their partner - back in Turkey and brought them into the EU - and more - some of the men married and divorced several times - each time seeking out their partners in Turkey.
It may make uncomfortable reading - but 75% of British Muslims for example are married to their first cousin - when these marriages are arranged they are done so with the intent of helping a relative - or family member to gain an EU passport.
The UK police has set up a forced marriage unit - to go and retrieve often girls from mostly - Pakistan and Bangladesh - coerced into or forcibly married.
Once the child reaches their teenage years - they are taken back to the old country for a visit - they are usually told they are visiting grandparents - but then they find a marriage has been arranged - and sometimes left - with their new spouse - while the family returns to the UK.
Recently a medical doctor was tricked into returning to Bangladesh to see ailing her mother (who was not sick), was drugged and imprisoned in the house - and married while under sedation. She managed to text her colleagues in London - who put the UK authorities on to it. Her family appealed to the Bangladeshi court - to force the woman to remain in the marriage and in the country - this was overturned and she was brought back to the UK. She was in a relationship and planned to marry a Hindu.
The London police - within the coming year will all be fully trained in how to deal with honor crime - in order to spot signs leading up to honor killing. When a person leaves Islam or marries outside of the family or doesn't go through with an arranged marriage - these people are often attacked and sometimes killed - and need to be placed under police protection - from their own families.
The problem with integration comes - mainly through the marriages - with each generation - you are importing all the old ways - and now a radical ideology. The new immigrants often come from village areas - and have low levels of education - if they were educated at all - and there is the language barrier and the culture shock.
So the average Muslim family even after successive generations may never acclimatised - but are foreign by their own making - and of course the lax immigration policies that allow this to continue.
cont..
Part 2
In fact several EU countries - have placed restrictions on the immigration marriage practise - France, Germany, Holland and Norway - and the UK Labour government has just put forward a proposal that will place restrictions on newcomers - for example state benefits will not be available for 5 years - and behaviour such as calling for Shari'a law - might see that person's right to remain revoked. The UK Conservatives say they will place limits on numbers of immigrants - and seek out higher skilled ones.
Some UK Muslim men have up to 4 wives - all imported - all with their own (council or government owned) houses - all paid for by the state. If this man had to work - could he afford this?
In France - to bring a spouse from Algeria or Morocco - one must prove that they have a job - and can support the new person - and then like Britain's new proposal that person will be on a 8 year probation (10 years in the UK) - to determine how interested they are in becoming a part of French life.
In Denmark one must be over 24 before they can marry someone from the Islamic world (less likely to result in forced marriages) in addition - the new partner must further have a connection other than the person they want to marry in order to be given residency ( and the results have been good - Danish Muslims are finding partners locally - and adjusting better to the EU way of life ).
At present immigrants are determining immigration policy - and in any modern society this doesn't make sense.
We are also importing a lot of radicalism - 40% of UK Muslims want Shari'a law in Britain - a law that gives priority to Muslims - places restrictions freedoms for all - and even more so for non-Muslims.
In some EU countries political pressure - and the need for votes has led to Shari'a law being considered by leading parties - hence the mass shift to the Right of politics.
In Europe the whole political field has shifted - no longer communism versus all that opposes it - it is Shari'a or Islamic law versus respect for individual freedoms and equality under the law.
Most of the immigrants in western Europe are doing well. They are members of parliament, cabinet ministers, mayor of Rotterdam, have functions in all parts of society etc. However there is a small number of immigrants, who do not want to recognise our law system and our customs. They seem to want to preserve their own non-european laws and customs. It seems that some immigrants have their backs to the future and that they only look at a static past. People who emigrate to another country will have to realise that by emigrating they are choosing a new future in a new country. This can be a painful process, but they will have to adjust to European customs and to the judicial system. The law of a country should protect every inhabitant of the country and every inhabitant should abide by the law of the country.
Denmark completely stopped the practise back in 2002 - before the word Islamophobe was invented - because they found that these levels of immigration were unsustainable
In fact, the terms Islamophobia and Islamophobe were known of at least back in the 1990s, certainly in the UK. I remember seeing them used in Q-News and being the title of various presentations, including one I attended in Aberystwyth.
This article is totally unoriginal and deals with none of the core issues. the author deconstructs Caldwell's argument and points out inconsistencies and half-truths in this book: this is basically a cliche college essay. it deals little if at all with the messy issue of where boundaries of freedom lie. this is ultimately not an ethnic issue but one of where boundaries of religious freedom and tolerance may be limited to protect the basic freedoms of individuals (like in the case of sharia) in a liberal society and it has implications for christianity as well.
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